Tactics Employed by Fighter-Bombers Operating Against Special Targets by 2nd Tactical Air Force
Canadian Military History
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 8
4-16-2012
Tactics Employed by Fighter-Bombers Operating
Against Special Targets
2nd Tactical Air Force
This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
2nd Tactical Air Force (2006) "Tactics Employed by Fighter-Bombers Operating Against Special Targets," Canadian Military History:
Vol. 15: Iss. 2, Article 8.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss2/8
71© Canadian Military History, Volume 15, Number 2, Spring 2006, pp.71-77.
1. During the past six months fighter-bomber 
attacks have been carried out by 2nd Tactical 
Air Force (2 TAF) against a series of special 
targets in France, Belgium and Holland. These 
operations have involved a considerable amount 
of pre-flight planning, and the results obtained 
have varied considerably. A brief analysis of these 
operations outlined below has brought to light 
certain contributory factors to their success or 
failure.
2. The main targets for special attention have 
been:-
(i) Enemy Military and SS Headquarters.
(ii) Canal lock gates.
An idea of the pre-flight planning and tactics 
involved in these forms of attack may be gained 
from a closer study of the particular targets.
Enemy Military Headquarters
3. HQ buildings during the period May – August 
1944 were mainly situated in large houses or 
chateaux, which lay in their own grounds well 
apart from any other buildings, and invariably 
well defended by flak. These targets were firstly 
attacked by rocket projectile (RP), but as the 
primary aim was the complete demolition of 
the building in the shortest possible time, and 
although the attacks were well co-ordinated 
and pressed home, they did not result in the 
complete destruction of the building. It was later 
found that the shallow dive attack, carried out 
by aircraft using 1,000-lb MC [medium capacity] 
or 500-lb MC bombs was far more successful in 
these operations than the standard RP attack, 
on account of the poor “near miss” value of the 
latter. A section of four aircraft, carrying 1,000-lb 
M.C. bombs, fused 11 secs. delay, with another 
two sections of RP operating as anti-flak, would 
approach the target at about 8,000 feet. The anti-
flak aircraft would then commence to dive when 
approximately 5 miles from the target, closely 
followed by the bomber force flying in echelon to 
starboard. The bombs were released at a height 
of about 500 feet, the method of aiming being to 
keep the sight on the target when releasing the 
bombs and not to pull through, as the normal 
tendency for bombs at that height and angle is 
to over-shoot.
4. During the period September – December 
1944, a number of Gestapo and SD (Security 
Police) Headquarters were subjected to attack 
by fighter-bombers. The pre-flight planning for 
these targets was more involved, owing to the 
fact that they were situated mainly in densely 
populated areas, and which required pinpoint 
accuracy. This planning was very largely aided 
by the extremely accurate information available 
from ground sources in the occupied territory 
regarding:-
(i) Hours of duty of enemy personnel.
(ii) Location of vital documents.
(iii) Construction of the building or buildings.
(iv) Flak in the area.
5. A model of the target was then constructed, 
showing its position relative to prominent 
landmarks to facilitate the lead in, obstructions, 
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and flak pinpoints. It was then necessary to 
investigate the damage required, which was 
usually:-
(i) The destruction of vital documents.
(ii) The killing of the Headquarters personnel.
6. Earlier operations had proved that the 
bombing of this type of target did not necessarily 
result in its complete destruction. In point of fact, 
in two previous attacks ground sources reported 
that the enemy had recovered more than two-
thirds of the documents scattered during the raid. 
In order to insure complete destruction by fire, it 
was found that a mixed load of 1,000 M.C. and 
500 lb. M.75 (phosphorous-filled) bombs, fused 
11 secs. was the most effective, as the 1000-lb 
bomb, hitting the building would break the walls 
and scatter the contents, and when immediately 
followed up by incendiary bombs would start a 
conflagration.
7. The attack was carried out in a similar 
manner to the earlier attacks, with RP aircraft 
acting as anti-flak. It is essential that the bomber 
force run into the target in a shallow dive, as 
opposed to 0-feet attack; otherwise the bomber 
section leaders do not see the target in time and 
may pass to either side of it, possibly seeing it 
too late for last minute correction. In addition, 
low-level bombing invariably results in the 
bomb striking the ground and ricocheting for a 
considerable distance past or to one side of the 
target. RP and cannon have been found to be 
particularly effective in neutralising the flak in 
the target area, and also act as an excellent decoy 
for the bomber force, which invariably comes in 
almost unnoticed.
8. The attacks on the Quisling headquarters at 
Amsterdam on 26 November and the Quisling 
headquarters at Rotterdam on 29 November 
are interesting examples. On both occasions the 
attack was preeceded by marker aircraft, who 
slightly preceeded the main force and successfully 
marked the target with phosphorous headed RP. 
One squadron then went in at low level and the 
last squadron finally dive bombed the target. 
Although the attack was well co-ordinated and the 
target accurately dive bombed, both operations 
were unsuccessful for the following reasons:-
(i) Owing to certain technical difficulties, 500-lb 
(M.76) bombs were not carried, so that although 
the building was well hit with 1,000-lb bombs, 
there were no incendiaries in the load to cause 
a conflagration. 
(ii) As pointed out above, the low level attack on 
29 November was a failure owing to the fact that 
the leader was too low to see the target ahead 
and passed to one side of it.
Right: A still shot from gun camera footage captures a 
Typhoon rocket attack.
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Lock Gates
9. Since the commencement of operations 
in Holland and western Germany, increasing 
emphasis has been laid on the disruption of 
barge traffic in the area vital for supply of enemy 
military stores in the forward areas. Thus the 
canal lock gates, which are spread at intervals 
and control large expanses of waterway, have 
received considerable attention from Typhoon 
fighter bombers. The more important sluice 
gates are well defended by flak, which is so 
positioned as to cover all possible approaches to 
the target. It is essential, therefore, that the flak 
positions be accurately plotted on the pre-flight 
planning model in order that the anti-flak aircraft 
can position themselves correctly for a well co-
ordinated strafe. It has been found that the best 
form of attacking this type of target is to operate 
two sections of four fighters bombers carrying 
1,000-lb MCs fused 11 secs., supported where 
necessary by twice the number of RP aircraft 
acting as anti-flak. The approach to the target is 
made in “finger” formation at about 8,000 feet 
to 10,000 feet with the anti-flak aircraft flying 
slightly above and on either side of the bomber 
A Supermarine Spitfire of 2nd Tactical Air Force is bombed up with a 
500-pounder in preparation for a dive-bombing attack in France.
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A Typhoon of 440 Squadron RCAF is prepared for its next mission. In the foreground lie some 1000-pound bombs.
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Rows of 3-inch rocket projectiles, used by the Hawker Typhoon, lay in readiness for the next mission.
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The dangers of low-level attacks are evident in 
these two photos:
Above: A Spitfire from 411 Squadron RCAF 
displays damage received during an attack on a 
bridge in the Nijmegen area in September 1944.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre PMR 78-253
Left: A Typhoon returned from an attack on a 
bridge in the Rouen area with a fuselage full of 
flak damage.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre PL 30161
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force. When about 5-7 miles from the target the 
anti-flak aircraft split into sections and dive 
down in loose echelon starboard on to their pre-
determined flak positions, whilst the bomber 
force lose height down to ground level when 
approximately 5 miles from the target, and on 
the final approach i.e. about 2 miles, pull up to 
500-feet to release their bombs, breaking away 
at low level until well clear of the target area. Two 
very effective attacks were carried out against the 
lock gates at Sneek and Gaarkeuken in Holland 
on 11 November 1944. Both operations resulted 
in the lock gates receiving direct hits which 
put them out of action for several days. The 
enemy, however, has endeavoured to overcome 
the effects of these attacks by rapidly erecting 
temporary locks a short distance up-stream, 
so that the waterway may be again immediately 
re-flooded and barge traffic continue. In view of 
this, particular attention must be paid to the area 
immediately after the attacks, and if photographic 
reconnaissance reveals repair work in progress 
to the locks and/or erection of temporary ones, 
another attack must be made with the least 
possible delay. The 1,000 lb MC fused 11 secs., is 
quite sufficient to destroy or severely damage the 
lock walls, whilst near misses between the canal 
bank and the lock gates will invariably damage 
the operating mechanism.
10. It is imperative for this type of operation that 
the leader of the first section gauges accurately 
the moment to pull up before release in order 
that sufficient interval is allowed for sighting 
and releasing of the bombs, at the same time not 
exposing the sections to flak for too long a period.
11. In conclusion, it is hoped that an analysis of 
attacks on further special targets can be made in 
the near future, and these will be made available 
as soon as possible.
A Rocket-firing Typhoon of a British squadron sits ready for its next mission in Normandy
while two other Typhoons taxi out to the runway for an operational sortie.
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